Change in the perceived reproductive age window and delayed fertility in Europe.

While extensive literature documents the massive fertility delay of recent decades, knowledge about whether and how attitudes towards the timing of births have changed in Europe remains limited. Using data from two rounds of the European Social Survey, we investigate these changes and their association with macro-level fertility indicators in 21 countries. Between 2006-07 and 2018-19, societal consensus regarding the existence of optimal childbearing ages remained strong and became more in favour of later parenthood. Decomposition analyses show that these shifts were driven only partially by changes in population composition, supporting the idea that a general attitudinal change in favour of later childbearing is underway. We also find a trend towards gender convergence in upper age limits driven by the increasing social recognition of an age deadline for men's childbearing. Although shifts in perceived reproductive age windows occurred during periods of birth postponement, they corresponded only loosely to country-level changes in fertility.

Explaining the urban-rural gradient in later fertility in Europe.

Demographic research shows that, in Europe, fertility takes place later and is lower in cities than in rural areas. One might expect fertility to be delayed in urban areas because of longer periods in education and enhanced career opportunities. We, therefore, examine how prevalent later fertility (35+ and 40+) is along the urban-rural axis, and whether differences can be explained by economic, cultural and compositional factors. We estimate multilevel random coefficient models, employing aggregated Eurostat data of 1328 Nomenclature des unités territoriales statistiques (NUTS) 3 and 270 NUTS 2 regions from 28 European countries. The urban-rural gradient in later fertility considerably diminishes once factors describing the economic environment, family and gender norms as well as population composition are accounted for. The higher prevalence of later fertility in cities is particularly associated with higher female education, greater wealth and a higher share of employment in high-technology sectors.

Polarized adult fertility patterns following early parental death.

Death of a parent during childhood has become rare in developed countries but remains an important life course event that may have consequences for family formation. This paper describes the link between parental death before age 18 and fertility outcomes in adulthood. Using the large national 2011 French Family Survey (INSEE-INED), we focus on the 1946-66 birth cohorts, for whom we observe entire fertility histories. The sample includes 11,854 respondents who have lost at least one parent before age 18. We find a strong polarization of fertility behaviours among orphaned males, more pronounced for those coming from a disadvantaged background. More often childless, particularly when parental death occurred in adolescence, some seem to retreat from parenthood. But orphaned men and women who do become parents seem to embrace family life, by beginning childbearing earlier and having more children, especially when the deceased parent is of the same sex.

Late fertility intentions increase over time in Austria, but chances to have a child at later ages remain low.

Childbearing takes place at increasingly older ages, and fertility is continuing to decrease across female birth cohorts. This study investigated whether the proportion of women who unintentionally forwent childbearing increased over time, and linked this to the age profile of fertility intentions and realization among men and women. This study was based on the Austrian Micro-Censuses (1986-2016) and on the Austrian Generations and Gender Surveys (panel data 2008/09 and 2012/13). Across the birth cohorts 1950-1979, an increasing proportion of women wanted to have children after 40 years of age, but more women failed to meet their fertility intentions expressed at 34-36 years of age. At the individual level, from 30 years of age, more than one-third of women and men with a strong fertility intention were found to persist with this intention within four years even at less fertile ages. In addition, women and men with a strong fertility intention became less likely to have a child with age: <10% of women and approximately 20% of men who had expressed a certain and short-term intention to have a child at 39-41 years of age in 2008/09 had a child by 2012/13. In particular, childless women and men, and those with only one child, persisted in certain and short-term positive intentions from 30 years of age, but parity was not a significant factor in their realization. The sharp increase in 'unrealized fertility' over time draws attention to the importance that personal circumstances and context encountered at older ages may have for fertility, and augurs a continued increase in the use of assisted reproduction.

Assessing Short-Term Fertility Intentions and Their Realisation Using the Generations and Gender Survey: Pitfalls and Challenges.

The use of fertility intention questions to study individual childbearing behaviour has developed rapidly in recent decades. In Europe, the Generations and Gender Surveys are the main sources of cross-national data on fertility intentions and their realisation. This study investigates how an inconsistent implementation of a question about wanting a child now affects the cross-country comparability of intentions to have a child within the next three years and their realisation. We conduct our analysis separately for women and men at prime and late reproductive ages in Austria, France, Italy and Poland. The results show that the overall share of respondents intending to have a child at some point in their life is similar in all four analysed countries. However, once the time horizon and the degree of certainty of fertility intentions are included, substantial cross-country differences appear, particularly in terms of proceptive behaviour and, consequently, the realisation of fertility intentions. We conclude that the inconsistent questionnaire adaptation makes it very difficult to assess the role of country context in the realisation of childbearing intentions.

Latest-Late Fertility? Decline and Resurgence of Late Parenthood Across the Low-Fertility Countries.

After decades of fertility postponement, we investigate recent changes in late parenthood across low-fertility countries in the light of observations from the past. We use long series of age-specific fertility rates from the Human Fertility Database (1950-2016) for women, and new data covering the period 1990-2016 for men. In 1950, the contribution of births at age 40 and over to female fertility rates ranged from 2.5 to 9 percent, but then fell sharply until the 1980s. From the 1990s, however, the prevalence of late first births increased rapidly, especially so in countries where it was initially lowest. This has produced a late fertility rebound in the last two decades, occurring much faster for women than for men. Comparisons between recent and past extremely late (age 48+) fertility levels confirm that people are now challenging the natural fertility barriers, particularly for a first child.

Contribution of the Rise in Cohabiting Parenthood to Family Instability: Cohort Change in Italy, Great Britain, and Scandinavia.

In this study, we investigate through microsimulation the link between cohabiting parenthood and family instability. We identify mechanisms through which increases in cohabiting parenthood may contribute to overall increases in separation among parents, linking micro-level processes to macro-level outcomes. Analyses are based on representative surveys in Italy, Great Britain, and Scandinavia (represented by Norway and Sweden), with full histories of women's unions and births. We first generate parameters for the risk of first and higher-order birth and union events by woman's birth cohort and country. The estimated parameters are used to generate country- and cohort-specific populations of women with stochastically predicted family life courses. We use the hypothetical populations to decompose changes in the percentage of mothers who separate/divorce across maternal birth cohorts (1940s to 1950s, 1950s to 1960s, 1960s to 1970s), identifying how much of the change can be attributed to shifts in union status at first birth and how much is due to change in separation rates for each union type. We find that when cohabiting births were uncommon, increases in parents' separation were driven primarily by increases in divorce among married parents. When cohabiting parenthood became more visible, it also became a larger component, but continued increases in parents' divorce also contributed to increasing parental separation. When cohabiting births became quite common, the higher separation rates of cohabiting parents began to play a greater role than married parents' divorce. When most couples had their first birth in cohabitation, those having children in marriage were increasingly selected from the most stable relationships, and their decreasing divorce rates offset the fact that increasing proportions of children were born in somewhat less stable cohabiting unions.

Declining realisation of reproductive intentions with age.

STUDY QUESTION: What is the likelihood of having a child within 4 years for men and women with strong short-term reproductive intentions, and how is it affected by age? SUMMARY ANSWER: For women, the likelihood of realising reproductive intentions decreased steeply from age 35: the effect of age was weak and not significant for men. WHAT IS KNOWN ALREADY: Men and women are postponing childbearing until later ages. For women, this trend is associated with a higher risk that childbearing plans will not be realised due to increased levels of infertility and pregnancy complications. STUDY DESIGN, SIZE, DURATION: This study analyses two waves of the nationally representative Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey. The analytical sample interviewed in 2011 included 447 men aged 18-45 and 528 women aged 18-41. These respondents expressed a strong intention to have a child in the next 3 years. We followed them up in 2015 to track whether their reproductive intention was achieved or revised. PARTICIPANTS/MATERIALS, SETTINGS, METHODS: Multinomial logistic regression is used to account for the three possible outcomes: (i) having a child, (ii) not having a child but still intending to have one in the future and (iii) not having a child and no longer intending to have one. We analyse how age, parity, partnership status, education, perceived ability to conceive, self-rated health, BMI and smoking status are related to realising or changing reproductive intentions. MAIN RESULTS AND THE ROLE OF CHANCE: Almost two-thirds of men and women realised their strong short-term fertility plans within 4 years. There was a steep age-related decline in realising reproductive intentions for women in their mid- and late-30s, whereas men maintained a relatively high probability of having the child they intended until age 45. Women aged 38-41 who planned to have a child were the most likely to change their plan within 4 years. The probability of realising reproductive intention was highest for married and highly educated men and women and for those with one child. LIMITATIONS, REASONS FOR CAUTION: Our study cannot separate biological, social and cultural reasons for not realising reproductive intentions. Men and women adjust their intentions in response to their actual circumstances, but also in line with their perceived ability to have a child or under the influence of broader social norms on reproductive age. WIDER IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS: Our results give a new perspective on the ability of men and women to realise their reproductive plans in the context of childbearing postponement. They confirm the inequality in the individual consequences of delayed reproduction between men and women. They inform medical practitioners and counsellors about the complex biological, social and normative barriers to reproduction among women at higher childbearing ages. STUDY FUNDING/COMPETING INTEREST(S): This research was partly supported by a Research School of Social Sciences Visiting Fellowship at the Australian National University and an Australian Research Council Discovery Project (DP150104248). Éva Beaujouan's work was partly funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) project 'Later Fertility in Europe' (Grant agreement no. P31171-G29). This paper uses unit record data from the HILDA Survey. The HILDA Project was initiated and is funded by the Australian Government Department of Social Services (DSS) and is managed by the Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research (Melbourne Institute). The findings and views reported in this paper, however, are those of the authors and should not be attributed to either DSS or the Melbourne Institute. The authors have no conflicts of interest.

Is the Family Size of Parents and Children Still Related? Revisiting the Cross-Generational Relationship Over the Last Century.

In most developed countries, the fertility levels of parents and children are positively correlated. This article analyzes the strength of the intergenerational transmission of family size over the last century, including a focus on this reproduction in large and small families. Using the large-scale French Family Survey (2011), we show a weak but significant correlation of approximately 0.12-0.15, which is comparable with levels in other Western countries. It is stronger for women than men, with a gender convergence across cohorts. A decrease in intergenerational transmission is observed across birth cohorts regardless of whether socioeconomic factors are controlled, supporting the idea that the family of origin has lost implicit and explicit influence on fertility choices. As parents were adopting the two-child family norm, the number of siblings lost its importance for having two children, but it continues to explain lower parity and, above all, three-child families. This suggests that the third child has increasingly become an "extra child" (beyond the norm) favored by people from large families.

Seeding the gender revolution: Women's education and cohort fertility among the baby boom generations.

In Europe and the United States, women's educational attainment started to increase around the middle of the twentieth century. The expected implication was fertility decline and postponement, whereas in fact the opposite occurred. We analyse trends in the quantum of cohort fertility among the baby boom generations in 15 countries and how these relate to women's education. Over the 1901-45 cohorts, the proportion of parents with exactly two children rose steadily and homogeneity in family sizes increased. Progression to a third child and beyond declined in all the countries, continuing the ongoing trends of the fertility transition. In countries with a baby boom, and especially among women with post-primary education, this was compensated for by decreasing childlessness and increasing progression to a second child. These changes, linked to earlier stages of the fertility transition, laid the foundations for later fertility patterns associated with the gender revolution.

The limited effect of increasing educational attainment on childlessness trends in twentieth-century Europe, women born 1916-65.

During the twentieth century, trends in childlessness varied strongly across European countries while educational attainment grew continuously across them. Using census and large-scale survey data from 13 European countries, we investigated the relationship between these two factors among women born between 1916 and 1965. Up to the 1940 birth cohort, the share of women childless at age 40+ decreased universally. Afterwards, the trends diverged across countries. The results suggest that the overall trends were related mainly to changing rates of childlessness within educational groups and only marginally to changes in the educational composition of the population. Over time, childlessness levels of the medium-educated and high-educated became closer to those of the low-educated, but the difference in level between the two better educated groups remained stable in Western and Southern Europe and increased slightly in the East.

Second Unions Now More Stable than First? A Comparison of Separation Risks by Union Order in France.

The frequency of union dissolutions increased sharply over the past 40 years in Western Europe and North America, resulting in a rapid growth in the number of persons living with a second partner. In studies of the 1980s, primarily conducted within the context of marriage, second partnerships were generally found to be less stable than first unions, but more recent studies provide more conflicting evidence. Taking the example of France, we study whether the relationship between first and second union stability indeed reversed between the 1970s and the 2000s, and how union and individual characteristics contributed to changes over time. The analysis presented here is based on the French Generations and Gender Survey (2005). The article first provides an overview of the differences in marriage, childbearing and breakup behaviours in first and second unions. Second, a piecewise linear model for repeated events is used to compare women's dissolution risks in first and second unions. The results show that over time, the higher instability of second compared to first unions disappeared. Further, women in second unions adopted unmarried cohabitation as a living arrangement more often across the whole period and were more likely to have stepchildren, which was associated with less stable unions. Taking into account this diversity of family situations, i.e. controlling for family form and children, second unions were more stable than first unions, even during the past. At both union orders, marriage breakup risks tended to stabilise despite a continuing increase in the prevalence of separation, which suggests that cohabitation increasingly acts as a filter for marriage.

Education and Cohabitation in Britain: A Return to Traditional Patterns?

Cohabitation is sometimes thought of as being inversely associated with education, but in Britain a more complex picture emerges. Educational group differences in cohabitation vary by age, time period, cohort, and indicator used. Well-educated women pioneered cohabitation in Britain in the 1970s and 1980s. In the most recent cohorts, however, the less educated have exceeded the best educated in the proportions ever having cohabited at young ages. But the main difference by education currently seems largely a matter of timing-that is, the less educated start cohabiting earlier than the best educated. In Britain, educational differentials in cohabitation appear to be reinstating longstanding social patterns in the level and timing of marriage. Taking partnerships as a whole, social differentials have been fairly stable. Following a period of innovation and diffusion, there is much continuity with the past.

Fertility postponement is largely due to rising educational enrolment.

The rise in educational enrolment is often cited as a possible cause of the trend to later childbearing in developed societies but direct evidence of its contribution to the aggregate change in fertility tempo is scarce. We show that rising enrolment, resulting in later ages at the end of education, accounts for a substantial part of the upward shift in the mean age at first birth in the 1980s and 1990s in Britain and in France. The postponement of first birth over that period has two components: a longer average period of enrolment and a post-enrolment component that is also related to educational level. The relationship between rising educational participation and the move to later fertility timing is almost certainly causal. Our findings therefore suggest that fertility tempo change is rooted in macro-economic and structural forces rather than in the cultural domain.

Cohabitation and marriage in Britain since the 1970s.

The article presents an overview of trends in cohabitation and marriage in Britain over several decades, using a consistent set of retrospective histories from the General Household Survey 1979-2007. Time-trends are presented, for men and women, of: the experience of different types of partnership by specified ages, the frequency of premarital cohabitation, the average time spent in different types of partnership, the timing of life course transitions, and the outcome of cohabitation and marriage at the fifth and tenth anniversaries.

Reweighting the general household survey 1979-2007.

We have calculated two new sets of weights applicable to the General Household Survey (GHS) from 1979 to 2007. One of these is for use with any general analysis of GHS topics and the second is designed for analyses of data collected in the Family Information section. The methods used follow closely those employed by ONS from 1996 onwards. The performance of the weights is assessed in estimating the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) from 1971-2007, an aggregate measure of fertility for which reliable figures are available at national level from vital registration statistics. Our weights improve the GHS estimates, reducing bias both in the TFR and in age-specific fertility rates.

Sources of error in reported childlessness in a continuous British household survey.

A recent investigation of the British General Household Survey (GHS) found substantial over-reporting of childlessness in recent years, particularly at older ages. We examine the phenomenon in further detail and find that the principal cause was change in survey procedures. To some extent the bias can be corrected for by using information on own children in the household. Revised fertility histories give period estimates of total fertility that are in close agreement with national vital registration statistics, unlike those based on original fertility histories of recent years. Misreporting in fertility histories dates primarily from administrative changes in the GHS in the years 1998-2000, and particularly from 2003, when the option of laptop self-completion (CASI) was introduced for reporting demographic histories.

Stability and change in fertility intentions in Britain, 1991-2007.

The very low fertility experienced in several European countries in recent decades in the presence of higher intended family sizes has renewed interest in fertility intentions data. While the overall level of childbearing in Britain over the past few decades has remained relatively stable and high in comparison with many other European countries, we have seen sizeable increases in the age at which childbearing starts. This study uses data from the 1991 to 2007 General Household Surveys to examine trends in family intentions data in an attempt to arrive at a better understanding of these recent fertility developments. First, time trends in intended family size are compared with trends in observed fertility. Next, aggregate changes in intentions regarding the level and timing of fertility across the life course for cohorts are investigated together with the extent to which these aggregate intentions are matched by the subsequent childbearing of cohorts. Finally, both change across the life course and uncertainty in family intentions are examined. We conclude by discussing what these findings might tell us about contemporary reproductive decision making.